Russian dating in georgia
Tbilisi also should expand its roster of potential partners, especially on the economic front.
Admittedly, Georgia’s future depends on both its own policy choices and conditions in its neighborhood, but a multipronged approach could help the country better respond to a changing geopolitical environment around the greater Caucasus and expand Tbilisi’s range of policy options and prospects for success.
He sidelined most of the warlords—including those who had brought him to power—and was elected president in his own right in 1995.
However, Shevardnadze struggled to get the machinery of the state running again; the economy was lifeless, corruption pervasive, and large numbers of internally displaced people from the two separatist wars posed a heavy burden for state coffers.
Starting in the 1990s, Russia began supporting separatist groups in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, applying an array of hard-edged political, economic, and military pressure tactics (including repeated attempts to assassinate Shevardnadze) to undermine Georgia.
Shevardnadze’s Citizens’ Union developed into a patronage network that rewarded post-Soviet elites and bureaucrats who backed him, fueling widespread corruption.
During the civil war, the country’s industrial base and infrastructure were devastated, and large swathes of territory were controlled by criminal paramilitary groups.
Shevardnadze lacked an electoral mandate for the first three years of his tenure, but he helped bring stability back to the country.
The Rose Revolution was triggered by protests against election manipulation, but made possible by economic discontent, frustration with high levels of corruption, and the tolerant atmosphere of the Shevardnadze era. Saakashvili’s reforms were necessary and successful, although the benefits were felt unevenly by different segments of the population.
At the same time, Georgia continues to face major ongoing challenges, in terms of consolidating its democratic progress and cultivating inclusive economic growth.
It must also manage its uneasy security relationship with Moscow and work with a West that is distracted by internal divisions and increasingly focused on security threats from the Middle East—a region not far from Georgia’s borders.
In January 1992, a group of warlords invited former Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze, who had previously been the Georgian Communist Party boss, to replace him.
Gamsakhurdia and his allies carried on their fight against the new government until late December 1993, when he was found dead with a gunshot wound to the head.